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Revocable and Decentralized
Attribute-Based Encryption
Hui Cui∗ and Robert H. Deng
Secure Mobile Centre, Singapore Management University, 71 Stamford Road, Singapore 178902, Singapore
∗Corresponding author: hcui@smu.edu.sg
In this paper, we propose a revocable and decentralized attribute-based encryption (ABE) system
that splits the task of decryption key generation across multiple attribute authorities (AAs) without
requiring any central party such that it achieves attribute revocation by simply stopping updating of
the corresponding private key. In our system, a party can easily behave as an AA by creating a public
and private key pair without any global communication except the creation for the common system
parameters, under which it can periodically issue/update private key components for users that reflect
their attributes, and an AA can freely leave the system once its corresponding attribute is revoked
without communication with other AAs. In addition, to revoke a user, those AAs that have issued
private keys to this user easily cease the key updating process for the user without affecting other AAs’
execution. For the construction of our system, the technical barrier is to make private keys collusion
resistant. Since in our system each component of a user’s private key at a time period may come
from different AAs and there is no coordination between these AAs, traditional technique of binding
together different components (issued by different AAs) of a private key by randomization cannot
be employed. To overcome this, we tie the key components together and prevent collusion attacks
between different users by embedding distinct identifiers and a commonly shared time attribute in
these components.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Public-key encryption can be viewed as a method for a user
to share data to a targeted user or device while protecting the
confidentiality of the transmitted information from other curi-
ous users. This is useful in scenarios where the data provider
knows exactly which user it wants to share data with, but this is
not realistic in applications where people are identified by their
attributes, and the data provider wants to convey data according
to some policy based on the privileged user’s attributes. Sahai
and Waters [1] proposed the notion of attribute-based encryp-
tion (ABE) to solve the above problem, where each user is
issued an attribute-based private key from an attribute authority
(AA) or key generation authority that reflects their attributes,
and a data provider can specify access policies to the data over
a set of attributes. A user will be able to decrypt a ciphertext
if the attributes under its private key satisfy the access policy
associated with the ciphertext. One drawback of the origi-
nal Sahai–Waters approach is that every user must prove its
ownership of a set of attributes to a trusted party to obtain
the corresponding attribute-based private key for decryption,
which implies the existence of a single trusted party who moni-
tors attributes and issues private keys for all users. To overcome
this limitation, the concept of multi-authority ABE [2, 3] was
introduced, where multiple AAs operate simultaneously, and
each distributes private key components corresponding to dif-
ferent sets of attributes. Since a trusted central authority (CA)
is still required in the multi-authority ABE schemes in [2, 3],
decentralized multi-authority ABE [4–6] was proposed to
avert the single security bottleneck incurred by counting on a
central AA.
The appearance of ABE affirmatively solves the problem
arising in the situations where different users with different
attributes are given access to different levels of the encrypted
data, but it fails to address the problem that the attributes of a
user may change with time. This problem initiated the study
of revocation [7] where a periodic key update would only
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allow non-revoked users to update their keys to decrypt the
newly encrypted data. Considering the ABE setting, there are
two main ways to realize revocability: (i) indirect revocation
[7, 8] where a sender encrypts with an attribute set and a time
attribute, and the AA, with the current revocation list, period-
ically provides key update information at each time period so
that only the non-revoked users can update their keys and thus
decrypt the ciphertexts encrypted at the current time period;
(ii) direct revocation [8, 9] where a sender specifies the revo-
cation list directly when running the encrypting algorithm (i.e.
the sender is required to possess the current revocation list),
such that the revocation can be done instantly and does not
require the key update phase as in the indirect method. Even
though direct revocation can be done immediately without the
key update process which asks for the communication from
the AA to all the non-revoked users over all the time periods,
it requires all the data providers to keep the current revocation
list, which makes the system be impurely attribute-based, since
data providers in the attribute-based setting create ciphertext
based only on attributes without caring revocation. On the con-
trary, indirect revocation does not require the data providers
to own the revocation list, but its key update phase is a bottle-
neck since it requires communication from the AA to all the
unrevoked users at all the time periods. In this paper, we focus
on the design of efficaciously and indirectly revocable ABE
schemes.
Motivated by the fact that decentralization essentially reduces
the trust on a central AA, we consider making use of it to allevi-
ate both communication cost and security bottleneck in the sin-
gle AA setting. That is, we would like the task of a single AA
to be split across multiple AAs to reduce the computation over-
head. We accomplish this by putting forward a notion of revoca-
ble and decentralized ABE with the goal of efficiently achieving
revocability in the decentralized ABE systems.
1.1. Our contributions
Based on the scheme given in [6], we present a decentralized
ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) system supporting indirect
revocation, which can be regarded as a CP-ABE scheme with
two properties: (i) decentralization—any party can become an
AA without the requirement of any global coordination except
the initialization of the common reference parameters created
during the setup phase and (ii) revocability—the AAs period-
ically update components of attribute-based private keys such
that only the non-revoked users can obtain their private keys
to decrypt the newly encrypted data in the current time period.
Thanks to the decentralization property, in our system, revoca-
tion of an attribute, i.e. completely removing an attribute from
the system, can be done by simply stopping issuing key update
by the corresponding AA. In addition, when an attribute of a
user is revoked, the corresponding AA can simply stop updat-
ing for this user with no influence on the update for this user
from other AAs. In our inial construction, each AA needs to
issue each user a new private key at different time slots, which
is convenient to be applied in the practice, and we found this
methodology under the decentralizing setting can reduce a sin-
gle AA’s workload. However, it would be desirable to reduce
the key update size of each AA from linear to logarithmic as in
[7]. Therefore, using the binary tree structure [7, 8], we extend
our original construction to a new scheme in which the amount
of work each AA has to do for key updates is mitigated and
the total size of key updates is reduced to logarithmic in the
number of users.
In a revocable and decentralized CP-ABE scheme, a party can
simply behave as an AA by creating a public and private key
pair, with which it can extract and periodically update compo-
nents of attribute-based private keys for different users. When
the attribute of an AA is revoked, this AA can freely terminates
its role as an AA by being inactive. Since different AAs oper-
ate entirely independently, the failure or corruption of some AAs
will not affect the functionality of the uncorrupted AAs. In our
system, the concept of global identifier [2, 6] is subtly applied
to link together the private key components issued to the same
user by multiple AAs, such that any data provider can encrypt
data in terms of any time period and any access policy over the
attributes issued from any set of AAs.
Our security model for the proposed scheme takes into
account all the adversarial capabilities in the standard ABE
security notion. First, the adversary should be able to learn the
private keys associated with the attribute sets of its choice. Sec-
ondly, the adversary should not be able to learn any information
about the message encrypted for the challenge set of attributes.
In addition, we assume that the adversary is given access to
the periodical key updates, which asks the adversary to be
unable to learn any information about the message encrypted
for any users with attributes containing the time period past the
revocation time, i.e. the ciphertext is created after the time of
revocation.
Challenges and solutions. Regarding the construction of a
revocable and decentralized ABE system, the key challenge is
to make it secure against collusion attacks.
Traditionally, to achieve collusion resistance in ABE, the
single AA combines different components (corresponding to
different attributes) of a user’s private key together by random-
izing the key. Such randomization makes different key elements
for one user compatible with each other, but not work with the
components of a key belonging to another user. However, this
technique of key randomization does not work in the setting of
decentralization, because there is no central party to tie all the
pieces together, and each part of a key may come from different
AAs who have no coordination and are possibly not aware the
existence of each other. To shun this obstacle, we resort to the
approach of tying a user’s key components together and pre-
venting collusion attacks between different users with different
global identities [6]. At a high level, this method, instead of
relying on one key generation to bind all the key components
together, uses a hash function on the user’s global identity GID
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to preserve collusion resistance across multiple key generations
from different AAs.
On the other hand, when encrypting a message, in our system,
a data provider, besides the usual attribute set input A, is also
required to specify the current time period Time. In this case, in
order to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted for a set of attributes A
and a time period Time, a user must possess the key components
for all i ∈ A under Time from different AAs which periodically
update key components at the start of each time period. Since the
time attribute is the same for all users, in case of compromising
the security, it is imperative to prevent collusion attacks. This
requires that revoked users cannot combine their keys with the
update information for the non-revoked users to decrypt a newly
created ciphertext which they are not able to decrypt with their
old keys. To achieve this, our approach is to bind the time period
and the global identifier together during key generation while
keeping the global identifier away during the encryption (i.e. the
system is still attribute-based).
Our system is proved secure using the recent dual sys-
tem encryption methodology [10], where the security proof
works by first converting the challenge ciphertexts and pri-
vate keys to a semi-functional form and then arguing the
security. Following the variant of the dual system proof tech-
nique in [11], we build our scheme using the bilinear groups
of composite order on the basis of the decentralization ABE
scheme in [6].
1.2. Related work
After Sahai and Waters [1] introduced the notion of ABE, Goyal
et al. formulated two complimentary forms of ABE [12], CP-
ABE [13] and key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) [12]. In a CP-ABE
system, the keys are associated with the sets of the attributes and
the ciphertexts are associated with the access policies, while in
a KP-ABE system, the situation is reversed that the keys are
associated with the access policies and the ciphertexts are asso-
ciated with the sets of the attributes. Since then, various kinds
of ABE systems have been proposed [2, 4–6, 8–10, 12, 14–19],
including multi-authority ABE [2, 4–6], ABE with full security
[10, 17], revocable ABE [7–9, 18] etc.
Multi-authority ABE was proposed by Chase [2] to construct
an ABE scheme where the decryption key is created by different
AAs. However, the solution presented in [2] need the presence
of a single trusted ‘CA’ to issue each AA a unique key. Chase
and Chow [4] tried to remove the CA using a distributed PRF,
but the scheme in [4] is achieved under an AND policy and a
determined set of AAs. Lin et al. [5] gave a threshold-based
scheme that is somewhat decentralized, but the set of AAs is
fixed ahead of time, and the system is only secure up to collu-
sion of m users. Lewko and Waters [6] presented the first fully
decentralized CP-ABE scheme, where any party can become
an AA (i.e. the system does not require any CA), and there
is no requirement for any global coordination other than the
generation of an initial set of common reference parameters.
Boldyreva et al. [7] proposed a revocable KP-ABE scheme
using an approach of indirect revocation where the AA indi-
rectly enables the revocation by forcing revoked users to be
unable to update their keys. In order to eliminate the impedi-
ent key update phase in the indirect revocation, Attrapadung
and Imai [9] put forth an ABE system with direct revocation,
which allows the senders to specify the revocation list directly
when encrypting by requiring the senders to keep the current
revocation list. Also, Attrapadung and Imai [8] raised a hybrid
revocable KP-ABE system under selective security model
which allows a sender to select whether to use either direct or
indirect revocation mode when encrypting a message. Sahai
et al. [18] provided the first revocable ABE scheme in a generic
way that deals with the problem of efficiently revoking stored
data, where the database can periodically update the cipher-
texts using only publicly available information stored on the
system.
1.3. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we briefly review the definitions associated with this work. In
Section 3, after the description of the system framework, we
elaborate the security model of revocable and decentralized
CP-ABE. In Section 4, we present a specific construction of
revocable and decentralized CP-ABE, and analyze its secu-
rity. In Section 5, we compare our construction with some
prior revocable ABE schemes, and then extend our revocable
and decentralized ABE system to improve its efficiency. We
conclude this paper in Section 6.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review some basic cryptographic conceptions
and definitions that are related to this work.
2.1. Access structures and linear secret sharing
We review the notions of access structures and linear secret shar-
ing schemes in [6, 16] as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Access Structure). Let {P1, . . . , Pn} be
a set of parties. A collection A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn} is monotone if
∀B, C : if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C, then C ⊆ A. An access struc-
ture (respectively, monotone access structure) is a collection
(respectively, monotone collection) A of non-empty subsets
of {P1, . . . , Pn}, i.e. A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn}\{∅}. The sets in A are
called the authorized sets, and the sets not in A are called the
unauthorized sets.
In this paper, attributes will play the role of the parties
and only the monotone access structures will be consid-
ered. Observe that more general access structures [6] can be
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(inefficiently) realized with the techniques by letting the nega-
tion of an attribute be a separate attribute (this doubles the total
number of attributes).
Definition 2.2 (Linear Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS)).
Let P be a set of parties. Let A be a matrix of size l × n. Let
ρ : {1, . . . , l} → P be a function that maps a row to a party for
labeling. A secret sharing scheme  over a set of parties P is a
linear secret-sharing scheme over Zp if
(1) The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
(2) There exists a matrix A which has l rows and n
columns called the share-generating matrix for .
For x = 1, . . . , l, the xth row of matrix A is labeled by a
party ρ(x), where ρ : {1, . . . , l} → P is a function that
maps a row to a party for labeling. Considering that
the column vector −→v = (s, r2, . . . , rn), where s ∈ Zp
is the secret to be shared and r2, . . . , rn ∈ Zp are ran-
domly chosen, then Av is the vector of l shares of the
secret s according to . The share (Av)x belongs to
party ρ(x).
It is shown in [6, 16] that every linear secret sharing scheme
consistent with the above definition meets the following lin-
ear reconstruction property. Suppose that  is an LSSS for
an access structure A. Let S ∈ A be an authorized set, and
define I ⊆ {1, . . . , l} as I = {x | ρ(x) ∈ S}. Then the vector
(1, 0, . . . , 0) is in the span of the rows of matrix A indexed
by I, and there exist constants {wx ∈ Zp} such that if {λx} are
valid shares of a secret s according to , then
∑
x∈I wxλx = s.
According to [6, 16], these constants {wx} can be found in
polynomial time in terms of the size of share-generating
matrix A.
For the construction under composite order group, the LSSS
matrices can be considered over ZN , where N = p1p2p3 is a
product of three distinct primes. A set S is authorized if the
rows of matrix A labeled by elements in S have the vector
(1, 0, . . . , 0) in their span modulo N . Regarding the security
proof, it will be further assumed that for an unauthorized set,
the corresponding rows of matrix A do not have the vector
(1, 0, . . . , 0) in their span modulo the individual prime factors
of N . This is because if an adversary can produce a matrix A
over ZN and an unauthorized set over ZN that is authorized
over Zpi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then this can be used to produce a
non-trivial factor of the group order N , which contradicts with
the complexity assumptions.
Boolean formulas [6]. Access policies can also be described
in terms of monotonic boolean formulas. LSSS access structures
are more general, and can be derived from representations as
boolean formulas. There are standard techniques to convert any
monotonic boolean formula into a corresponding LSSS matrix.
The boolean formula can be represented as an access tree, where
the interior nodes are AND and OR gates, and the leaf nodes cor-
respond to attributes. The number of rows in the corresponding
LSSS matrix will be same as the number of leaf nodes in the
access tree.
2.2. Composite-order bilinear groups and complexity
assumptions
Let G be a group generator algorithm which takes a security
parameter λ as the input and outputs (p1, p2, p3, G, GT , eˆ),
where p1, p2, p3 are distinct primes, G and GT are cyclic groups
of order N = p1p2p3, and eˆ : G × G → GT is a map with the
following properties [20]:
(1) Bilinear. ∀g, h ∈ G, a, b ∈ ZN , eˆ(ga, hb) = eˆ(g, h)ab.
(2) Non-degenerate. ∃g ∈ G such that eˆ(g, g) has order N
in GT .
Assume that the group operations in G and GT as well as the
bilinear map eˆ are computable in polynomial time with respect
to λ and that the group descriptions of G and GT include the
generators of the respective cyclic groups. Let Gp1 , Gp2 and Gp3
be the subgroups of order p1, p2 and p3 in G, respectively. It is
observed in [6] when hi ∈ Gpi and hj ∈ Gpj for i 
= j, eˆ(hi, hj) is
the identity element in GT . This orthogonality property of Gp1 ,
Gp2 , Gp3 will be used to implement the semi-functionality in the
constructions.
Let Gp1p2 denote the subgroup of order p1p2 in G. Let g1 ←
Gp1 denote that g1 is chosen to be a random generator of Gp1
(so it is not the identity element), and T1 ← G denote that T1
is chosen to be a random generator of G (this is not quite the
same as a uniformly random element, but the distributions are
negligibly close).
Given a group generatorG, the assumptions used in this paper
are defined in Fig. 1. The advantage of algorithmA in breaking
Assumption i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} is defined to be
AdvAmpiG,A (λ) = |Pr[A(D, T1) = 1] − Pr[A(D, T2) = 1]|.
We say that G satisfies Assumption i if AdvAmpiG,A (λ) is a neg-
ligible function of the security parameter λ for any polynomial
time algorithm A.
Note that in Assumption 1, T1 can be written (uniquely) as the
product of an element of Gp1 , an element of Gp2 and an element
of Gp3 . In this paper, these elements will be referred to as the
‘Gp1 part of T1’, the ‘Gp2 part of T1’ and the ‘Gp3 part of T1’,
respectively (Fig. 1).
3. FRAMEWORK AND SECURITY MODEL
In this section, we present the formal definition of revocable and
decentralized ABE, after depicting the architecture of our ABE
system.
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Assumptions Distributions for G = (N = p1p2p3, G, GT , eˆ) ← G
1 g1 ← Gp1 ,
D = (G, g1),
T1 ← G, T2 ← Gp1 .
2 g1, X1 ← Gp1 , X2 ← Gp2 , g3 ← Gp3 ,
D = (G, g1, g3, X1X2),
T1 ← Gp1 , T2 ← Gp1p2 .
3 g1, X1 ← Gp1 , Y2 ← Gp2 , X3, Y3 ← Gp3 ,
D = (G, g1, X1X3, Y2Y3),
T1 ← Gp1p2 , T2 ← Gp1p3 .
4 g1 ← Gp1 , g2 ← Gp2 , g3 ← Gp3 , a, b, c, d ← ZN
D = (G, g1, g2, g3, g1a, g1bg3b, g1c, g1acg3d),
T1 ← eˆ(g1, g1)abc, T2 ← GT .
FIGURE 1. Assumptions 1–4.
3.1. Framework
A revocable and decentralized CP-ABE system is comprised of
the following algorithms: global setup algorithm GSetup, AA
setup algorithm ASetup, attribute-based private key generation
& update algorithm KeyGen & KeyUpdate, encryption algo-
rithm Encrypt and decryption algorithm Decrypt. Assume that
the attribute-based private keys of the non-revoked users will
be renewed periodically (e.g. every month), and the senders
encrypt using the receivers’ attributes and the current time
period, e.g. ‘June of 2015’. Also, there exists a revocation list
for each attribute in the system, which stores the identities of
all the revoked users associated with the attribute, and is held
by the corresponding AA.
(i) GSetup(1λ) → GP. Taking the security parameter λ as
the input, this global setup algorithm outputs the global
parameter GP for the system.
(ii) ASetup(GP) → (apk, ask). Taking the global parame-
ter GP as the input, each AA creates its own master pub-
lic and private key pair (apk, ask).
(iii) KeyGen & KeyUpdate (GP, GID, Time, rli, i, ask) →
skTimei,GID. Taking the global parameter GP, a time period
Time, a revocation list rli, an identity GID, an attribute
i belonging to some AA and a master private key ask
for this AA as the input, this key generation and update
algorithm produces the update key skTimei,GID for this
attribute, identity and time tuple.
(iv) Encrypt(GP, M , Time, (A, ρ), {apk}) → C. Taking the
global parameter GP, a message M , a time period Time,
an access matrix (A, ρ) and a set of the master public
keys for the relevant AAs as the input, this encryption
algorithm outputs a ciphertext C.
(v) Decrypt(GP, C, {skTimei,GID}) → M . Taking the global
parameter GP, the ciphertext C and a collection of
update keys corresponding to the attribute, identity
and time tuples with the same identity GID and time
period Time as the input, this decryption algorithm
outputs either the message M when the collection of
attributes i satisfies the access matrix corresponding to
the ciphertext C, or a symbol ⊥ indicating the failure
of the decryption.
We require that a revocable and decentralized CP-ABE sys-
tem is correct, meaning that if GP is generated from the global
setup algorithm, C is generated from the encryption algorithm
on a message M and a time period Time, and {skTimei,GID} is a set
of private keys obtained from the key generation algorithm for
the same identity GID at the time period Time over a set of
attributes satisfying the access structure of the ciphertext, then
Decrypt(GP, C, {skTimei,GID}) = M .
3.2. Security definition
Assuming that the adversary corrupts the AAs statically [2, 4, 6]
and make the key generation & update queries adaptively, we
define the security for revocable and decentralized CP-ABE
encryption systems by the following game between a challenger
algorithm C and an adversary algorithm A.
Let S be the set of all the AAs, and U be the universe
of attributes. Suppose that each AA can control multiple
attributes, but each attribute is assigned to only one AA. To
match the practice, it can be considered as an attribute being
the concatenation of an AA’s public key and an attribute string,
such that if multiple AAs choose the same attribute, these will
still correspond to distinct attributes in the system.
(i) Setup. Algorithm C runs the global setup algorithm.
Algorithm A defines a set of S′ ⊆ S of corrupt AAs.
For these non-compromised AAs S − S′, algorithm
C obtains the public and private key pairs by running
the AA setup algorithm, and gives the public keys to
algorithm A.
(ii) Phase 1. Algorithm A makes the key generation &
update query to algorithm C. Algorithm A sends tuples
(i, Time, GID) to algorithm C, where i is an attribute
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belonging to an non-corrupted AA, Time is a time
period, GID is an identity. Algorithm C responds by
returning the corresponding updated key skTimei,GID to
algorithm A.
(iii) Challenge. Algorithm A chooses two messages M0
and M1, a time period Time∗ and an access matrix
(A, ρ) with the constraint that the key generation &
update queries {skTime∗i,GID } in Phase 1 do not satisfy
the access matrix (A, ρ). Let V denote the subset of
the rows of A labeled by the attributes controlled by
the corrupt AAs. Let VGID denote the subset of the
rows of A labeled by attributes i for which algorithm
A has queried (i, GID, Time∗) for each global identi-
fier GID. For each GID, to prevent algorithm A from
asking for a set of keys that allow decryption, in com-
bination with any keys that can obtained from the
corrupt AAs, we require that the subspace spanned by
V ∪ VGID must not include (1, 0, . . . , 0). In addition,
algorithm A must give algorithm C the public keys for
any corrupt AAs whose attributes appear in the label-
ing ρ. Algorithm C chooses a random bit β ∈ {0, 1},
and sends algorithm A a challenge ciphertext C∗, an
encryption of Mβ under access matrix (A, ρ) and time
period Time∗.
(iv) Phase 2. AlgorithmA continues issuing the key genera-
tion & update queries (i, Time, GID) with the constraint
as follows. If algorithm A makes key generation &
update queries
{
skTime∗i,GID
}
, they must not violate the
constraint on the challenge matrix (A, ρ) as in the
Challenge phase.
(v) Guess. AlgorithmAmakes a guess β ′ for β, and it wins
the game if β ′ = β.
Algorithm A’s advantage in this game is defined as
Pr[β = β ′] − 1/2. We say that a revocable and decentral-
ized ABE scheme is secure if all the probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in
the security parameter λ.
Remarks. Note that our security definition is a little different
from that presented in [8, 18]. First, the definition in [8] consid-
ers selective security, where the adversary is required to specify
the target time period and attribute set before having access to
the public parameter, while ours focuses on full security without
such limitation. Secondly, the definition in [18] puts the time in a
sequential order, which requires that the adversary, after seeing
the target time period, is not allowed to issue key update queries
for time period equal to or greater than the target one when the
adversary makes private key queries with sufficient attributes
to decrypt the target ciphertext, whereas in our model the time
period is out of order, and thus the adversary is restricted to make
key generation & update queries for time period equal to the tar-
get one under the same condition.
4. A REVOCABLE AND ONE-USE
MULTI-AUTHORITY CP-ABE SYSTEM
In this section, we describe a revocable and one-use multi-
authority CP-ABE scheme, and then prove its security in
the random oracle model using the dual system encryption
technique [10].
4.1. Construction
The one-use decentralized ABE with revocability system is
composed of the following algorithms, of which some are the
same as that in [6].
(i) GSetup. The system chooses a composite order bilinear
group G of which the group order is a product of three
primes as N = p1p2p3, a generator g1 of Gp1 , two hash
function H0 : {0, 1}∗ → ZN , H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G. The
global public parameter is GP = (N , g1, H0, H1).
(ii) ASetup. For every attribute i belonging to the AA (these
indices i are not reused between different AAs), the AA
randomly chooses αi, yi ∈ ZN as the private key ask and
computes apk = eˆ(g1, g1)αi , g1yi) as the public key.
(iii) KeyGen & KeyUpdate. To generate an attributed-based
private key for GID /∈ rli for attribute i at time period
Time, the AA computes
skTimei,GID = g1αiH0(Time)H1(GID||Time)yi .
The attribute-based private key for user GID at time
period Time is {skTimei,GID}.
(iv) Encrypt. Let vx be Ax · −→v , wx be Ax · −→w , where Ax is row
x of access matrix A. It is required that the row labeling
ρ of an access matrix to be injective, i.e. each attribute
is used at most once. To encrypt a message M under an
n × l access matrix A with ρ mapping the rows to the
attributes, the data provider randomly chooses s ∈ ZN ,−→v ∈ ZlN with s as its first entry, respectively, −→w ∈ ZlN
with 0 as its first entry, rx ∈ ZN for each row Ax of A, and
computes
C0 = M · eˆ(g1, g1)s,
∀x C1,x = eˆ(g1, g1)vx eˆ(g1, g1)αρ(x)H0(Time)rx ,
C2,x = g1rx ,
C3,x = g1yρ(x)rx g1wx .
The data provider outputs the ciphertext C = (C0,
{C1,x}, {C2,x}, {C3,x}).
(v) Decrypt. Assume that the ciphertext is encrypted under
an access matrix (A, ρ). To decrypt a ciphertext C, the
receiver first computes H1(GID||Time). If the receiver
has the private keys {skTimeρ(x),GID} for a subset of rows Ax
of access matrix A such that (1, 0, . . . , 0) is in the span
of these rows, the receiver proceeds as follows. For each
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such x, the receiver computes
C1,x · eˆ(H1(GID||Time), C3,x)
eˆ(skTimeρ(x),GID, C2,x)
= eˆ(g1, g1)vx eˆ(H1(GID||Time), g1)wx .
The receiver then chooses cx ∈ ZN such that∑
x cxAx = (1, 0, . . . , 0), and computes∏
x
(eˆ(g1, g1)vx eˆ(H1(GID||Time), g1)wx)cx
= eˆ(g1, g1)s, M = C0
eˆ(g1, g1)s
.
where vx = Ax · −→v , wx = Ax · −→w for −→v · (1, 0, . . . , 0)
= s, −→w · (1, 0, . . . , 0) = 0,
Multi-use multi-authority CP-ABE. The construction we pre-
sented will be proved secure under the restriction that attributes
are used only once. It has been showed in [6] how to construct
a secure multi-use multi-authority CP-ABE system where
attributes can be used multiple times in an access matrix from
a secure multi-authority CP-ABE scheme where attributes are
used only once with a simple encoding technique. Since our
revocable and decentralized CP-ABE scheme is built upon the
scheme in [6], this encoding approach can be applied to our
construction as well.
Removing secure channels. In our system, each available AA
(whose attribute has not been revoked) needs to update users’
private keys at a regular basis. This means that all the users have
to regularly contact each AA, prove their attributes and get new
private keys, which implies that all the available AAs must be
online for all such communications, and a secure channel must
be established between each AA and each user to transmit the
private key. This becomes extremely annoying for a very large
number of users. In order to avoid the need for frequent inter-
action and a secure channel, we can ask each AA to encrypt the
new keys of non-revoked users under their global identities and
the previous time period [7], and forward the ciphertexts to these
users. With this approach, for every non-revoked user, each AA
is required to perform one key generation and one encryption per
key update.
4.2. Security
In order to reduce the security of our revocable and decen-
tralized attribute-based encryption system, the dual system
encryption technique [10] is applied, in which the keys and
the ciphertexts are divided as normal and semi-functional: the
normal keys can decrypt the semi-functional ciphertexts, the
semi-functional keys can decrypt the normal ciphertexts, but
the semi-functional keys cannot decrypt the semi-functional
ciphertexts. The proof is proceeded over a sequence of games,
where firstly the challenge ciphertext is changed to be semi-
functional, and then the keys are changed to be semi-functional
one by one. These games are indistinguishable from each other,
which can be proved from the fact that the simulator itself
cannot tell the form of the key being turned from normal to
semi-functional by decrypting a semi-functional ciphertext.
Since the construction of our system is very similar to that in
[6], we begin with the definitions of the semi-functional cipher-
texts and keys based on that in [6], which are not used in the
real system but will be used in the proof. The semi-functional
ciphertexts will include elements from subgroups Gp2 and Gp3 ,
and the semi-functional keys will be Types 1 and 2, containing
elements in Gp2 and Gp3 , respectively. When a semi-functional
key of Type 1 is used to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext,
the extra elements from Gp2 in the key will be tied with the extra
Gp2 elements in the ciphertext, which will cause the decryption
to fail. When a semi-functional key of Type 2 is used to decrypt
a semi-functional ciphertext, the extra elements from Gp3 in the
key will be tied with the extra Gp3 elements in the ciphertext,
which will cause the failure of the decryption. Specifically, each
attribute i is assigned with two random elements zi, ti ∈ ZN ,
and they will be common to the semi-functional ciphertexts
and keys. Note that zi, ti are fixed for each attribute i, and will
not be changed for different users.
(i) Semi-functional ciphertexts. To create a semi-functional
ciphertext, the encryption algorithm is run to obtain a
normal ciphertext (C′0, C
′
1,x, C
′
2,x, C
′
3,x∀x). Let g2, g3
be the generators of Gp2 and Gp3 , respectively. Let
−→u2 ,−→u3 ∈ ZlN be two randomly chooses vectors. For each
row Ax of the access matrix A, define δx = Ax · −→u2 ,
σx = Ax · −→u3 . Let B be the subset of the rows of the
access matrix A whose corresponding attributes belong
to the corrupt AAs. Let B¯ be the subset of the rows of the
access matrix A whose corresponding attributes are con-
trolled by the uncorrupt AAs. Thus, the semi-functional
ciphertext is formed as C0 = C′0,
∀x, Ax ∈ B¯ C1,x = C′1,x,
C2,x = C′2,xg2γx g3ψx ,
C3,x = C′3,xg2δx+γxzρ(x)g3σx+ψxtρ(x) ,
∀x, Ax ∈ B C1,x = C′1,x, C2,x = C′2,x,
C3,x = C′3,xg2δxg3σx ,
where γx, ψx ∈ ZN are randomly chosen from ZN . A
ciphertext is said to be notionally semi-functional when
all the values δx are the shares of 0.
(ii) Semi-functional keys. The attribute-based private key
for identity GID and time period Time is defined to
be the collection of H1(GID||Time) and all the keys
skTimei,GID for attributes i belonging to the uncorrupt AAs
queried by the adversary throughout the game. The
semi-functional keys for an identity GID and a time
period Time will be of Type 1 or Type 2.
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Let H ′1(GID||Time) be a random element of Gp1 .
To create a semi-functional key of Type 1, the random
oracle’s outputs on GID||Time is defined to be
H1(GID||Time) = H ′1(GID||Time)g2c1 ,
where c1 ∈ ZN . Thus, a semi-functional key skTimei,GID for
an attribute i controlled by an uncorrupt AA can be
generated by producing a normal key skTime′i,GID and then
setting
skTimei,GID = skTime
′
i,GID g2
c1zi
.
To create a semi-functional key of Type 2, the random
oracle’s outputs on GID||Time is defined to be
H1(GID||Time) = H ′1(GID||Time)g3c1 ,
where c1 ∈ ZN . Thus, a semi-functional key skTimei,GID for
an attribute i belonging to an uncorrupt AA can be gener-
ated by producing a normal key skTime′i,GID and then setting
skTimei,GID = skTime
′
i,GID g3
c1ti
.
Note that when a semi-functional key of Type 1 is
used to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext, the addi-
tional elements eˆ(g2, g2)c1δx prevent the decryption
from succeeding, except when the values δx are shares
of 0 (i.e. it is a notionally semi-functional ciphertext).
Likewise, when a semi-functional key of Type 2 is used
to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext, the additional
elements eˆ(g3, g3)c1δx make the decryption fail.
Taking the one-use restriction on attributes throughout the
proof into consideration, which means that the row labeling ρ
of the challenge ciphertext access matrix (A, ρ) must be injec-
tive, we formally define the sequence of the games on the basis
of that in [6].
The first game, GameReal, is the real security game. The next
game, GameReal′ , is similar to the real security game, except that
the random oracle maps identities GID and time periods Time to
the random elements of Gp1 instead of G.
Game0 is similar to GameReal′ , except that the ciphertext
given to the adversary is semi-functional. Let q be the number
of identities GID and time periods Time for which the adver-
sary makes the key queries skTimei,GID. Gamej,1 and Gamej,2 for
j ∈ [1, q] are defined as follows:
(i) Gamej,1. This is similar to Game0, except that for the
first j − 1 queried pairs of identity and time period, the
received keys are semi-functional of Type 2, and the
received key for the jth queried pair of identity and time
period is semi-functional of Type 1. The remaining
keys are normal.
(ii) Gamej,2. This is similar to Game0, except that for
the first j queried pairs of identity and time period,
the received keys are semi-functional of Type 2. The
remaining keys are normal. Note that in Gameq,2, all
the keys are semi-functional of Type 2.
(iii) GameFinal. In this game, all the attribute-based private
keys are semi-functional of Type 2, and the ciphertext is
a semi-functional encryption of a random message. Note
that the adversary has advantage 0 in this game.
These games are indistinguishable according to the follow-
ing lemmas. Recall that the proof of security is considered under
the restriction that each attribute is used at most one time in the
access matrix, i.e. ρ is injective. Note that some contents of the
proofs exactly follow that in [6].
Lemma 4.1. Assuming that there exists a polynomial time
algorithm A such that AdvGameRealA − Adv
GameReal′
A = , then
there exists construct a polynomial time algorithm B with
advantage  in breaking Assumption 1.
Proof. Given N , g1, T , algorithm B chooses a hash func-
tion H0 : {0, 1}∗ → ZN , and will simulate either GameReal or
GameReal′ with algorithm A, depending on the value of T .
Algorithm B outputs g1 as the public generator of Gp1 and N
as the group order. Algorithm A specifies a set S′ ⊆ S of the
corrupt AAs for S being the set of all the AAs in the system.
For each attribute i belonging to an uncorrupt AA, algorithm
B randomly chooses αi, yi ∈ ZN , and sends algorithm A the
public parameter eˆ(g1, g1)αi , g1yi .
For the queries to the random oracle for H1(GID||Time)
issued by algorithm A, algorithm B randomly chooses
hGID,Time ∈ ZN and sets
H1(GID||Time) = ThGID,Time .
Algorithm B stores this value so that it can respond consis-
tently when H1(GID||Time) is queried again. If T is a generator
of Gp1 , this value will be a random element of Gp1 . If T is a gen-
erator of G, this value will be a random element of G.
For the queries (GID, Time, i) to the key generation & update
oracle from algorithm A, algorithm B extracts the correspond-
ing private key by using the key generation & update algorithm
with the known values αi and yi. Note that if GID||Time has
not been issued to the random oracle yet, algorithm B sets
H1(GID||Time) as above.
When it comes to the challenge phase, algorithm A gives
algorithm B two messages M0, M1, a time period Time∗ and
an access matrix (A, ρ), as well as the public parameter for the
corrupted AAs appearing in the matrix. To create the challenge
ciphertext for Mβ where β ∈ {0, 1} is a random bit chosen by
algorithm B, algorithm B runs the encryption algorithm.
If T is a generator of G, then algorithm B has correctly simu-
lated GameReal. If T is a generator of Gp1 , then algorithm B has
correctly simulated GameReal′ . Thus, algorithm B can use algo-
rithm A to attain advantage  in breaking Assumption 1.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.2. Assuming that there exists a polynomial time
algorithmA such that AdvGameReal′A − AdvGame0A = , then there
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exists a polynomial time algorithmB with advantage negligibly
close to  in breaking Assumption 1.
Proof. Given N , g1, T , algorithmB chooses a hash function H0 :
{0, 1}∗ → ZN , and will simulate either GameReal′ or Game0 with
algorithmA, depending on the value of T . AlgorithmB outputs
g1 as the public generator of Gp1 and N as the group order. Algo-
rithmA specifies a set S′ ⊆ S of the corrupt AAs for S being the
set of all the AAs in the system. For each attribute i belonging
to an uncorrupt AA, algorithmB randomly chooses αi, yi ∈ ZN ,
and gives algorithm A the public parameter eˆ(g1, g1)αi , g1yi .
For the queries to the random oracle for H1(GID||Time) from
algorithm A, algorithm B randomly chooses hGID,Time ∈ ZN ,
and sets
H1(GID||Time) = ghGID,Time1 .
Algorithm B stores this value so that it can respond consis-
tently when H1(GID||Time) is queried again.
For the queries (GID, Time, i) to the key generation & update
oracle from algorithm A, algorithm B extracts the correspond-
ing private key by running the key generation & update algo-
rithm with αi and yi which are known to algorithm B. Again, if
GID||Time has not been queried to the random oracle yet, algo-
rithm B sets H1(GID||Time) as above.
For the challenge phase, algorithm A gives algorithm B
two messages M0, M1, a time period Time∗ and an access
matrix (A, ρ), as well as the public parameter gyi , eˆ(g1, g1)αi
for attributes i belonging to the corrupt AAs that are included
in the access matrix (A, ρ). Algorithm B chooses a random
bit β ∈ {0, 1}, and encrypts Mβ as follows. First, algorithm
B randomly chooses s ∈ ZN , and sets C0 = Mβ · eˆ(g1, g1)s.
Algorithm B then chooses two vectors, −→v = (s, v2, . . . , vl),−→w = (0, w2, . . . , wl), where v2, . . . , vl, w2, . . . , wl are ran-
domly chosen from ZN .
Let vx = Ax · −→v and wx = Ax · −→w . Let B denote the subset of
the rows of A whose corresponding attributes belong to the cor-
rupted AAs. Let B¯ be the subset of the rows of A whose corre-
sponding attributes belong to the uncorrupt AAs. For each row
Ax ∈ B, algorithm B randomly chooses rx ∈ ZN , and computes
the ciphertext as
C1,x = eˆ(g1, g1)vx(eˆ(g1H0(Time∗), g1)αρ(x) )rx ,
C2,x = g1rx ,
C3,x = (g1yρ(x) )rx Twx .
For each row Ax ∈ B¯, algorithmB randomly chooses r′x ∈ ZN ,
implicitly sets rx = rr′x such that g1r is the Gp1 part of T (T will
be embedded into the calculation with shares wx), and computes
the ciphertext as
C1,x = eˆ(g1, g1)vx(eˆ(g1H0(Time∗), T)αρ(x)r′x),
C2,x = Tr′x ,
C3,x = Tyρ(x)r′x Twx .
Note that the Gp1 part of Twx is g1Ax·r
−→w
, where r−→w is a ran-
dom vector with the first coordinate equal to 0. Thus, if T ∈ Gp1 ,
this is a correctly distributed normal ciphertext. If T ∈ G, then
this is a semi-functional ciphertext with δx = Ax · c−→w modulo
p2 where g2c is the Gp2 part of T , σx = Ax · d−→w modulo p3
where g3d is the Gp3 part of T , g2γx equals the Gp2 part of Tr
′
x ,
g3ψx equals the Gp3 part of Tr
′
x , zρ(x) = yρ(x) modulo p2, and
tρ(x) = yρ(x) modulo p3.
This is correctly computed. Since r′x, yρ(x) are randomly
chosen in ZN , their values modulo p1, modulo p2 and modulo
p3 are uncorrelated by the Chinese Remainder Theorem [6].
This means that γx, ψx, zρ(x), tρ(x) are randomly distributed,
w2, . . . , wl of −→w are also randomly distributed modulo p2, p3,
but both δx and σx are the shares of 0 from algorithm B’s point
of view. Hence, it remains to be argued that these appear to be
the shares of a random exponent in the view of algorithm A.
Note that the shares δx, σx for the rows Ax ∈ B are
information-theoretically revealed to algorithm A, but the
space R spanned by these rows cannot include the vector
(1, 0, . . . , 0) (assume that this holds modulo p2). This means
that there exists a vector −→u such that −→u is orthogonal to R
modulo p2, but −→u is not orthogonal to (1, 0, . . . , 0). Fix a basis
including the vector −→u , and write c−→w = −→w′ + a−→u for some
a modulo p2 and
−→
w′ in the span of the other basis elements.
Note that −→w is uniformly distributed in this space (modulo
p2) and reveals no information about a (modulo p2). Now, the
first coordinate of c−→w modulo p2 depends on the value of a,
and the shares δx for Ax ∈ B contain no information about a
(since −→u is orthogonal to R). The only information algorithm
A receives about the value of a appears in the exponents of the
form δx + γxzρ(x), where the zρ(x) is a new random value each
time that appears nowhere else (recall that ρ is constrained to
be injective). As long as γx does not equal 0 modulo p2 (γx = 0
with only negligible probability), this means that any value
of δx can be explained by zρ(x) taking on a particular value.
Since zρ(x) is uniformly random, this means that no informa-
tion about the value of a is revealed. Hence, the value being
shared is information-theoretically hidden, and the shares δx
(and similarly σx) are well distributed in algorithm A’s view.
Thus, when T ∈ Gp1 , algorithm B correctly simulates
GameReal′ . When T ∈ G, algorithm B properly simulates
Game0 with probability negligibly close to 1. Therefore, algo-
rithm B can use algorithm A to obtain advantage negligibly
close to  in breaking Assumption 1.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.3. Assuming that there exists a polynomial time
algorithm A such that AdvGamej−1,2A − Adv
Gamej,1
A = , then
there exists construct a polynomial time algorithm B with
advantage negligibly close to  in breaking Assumption 2.
Proof. Given g1, g3, X1X2, T , algorithmB chooses a hash func-
tion H0 : {0, 1}∗ → ZN , and will simulate either Gamej−1,2 or
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Gamej,1 with algorithm A, depending on the value of T . Algo-
rithm B outputs g1 as the public generator of Gp1 and N as the
group order. Algorithm A specifies a set S′ ⊆ S of the corrupt
AAs for S being the set of all the AAs in the system. For each
attribute i belonging to an uncorrupt AA, algorithmB randomly
chooses αi, yi ∈ ZN , and gives algorithmA the public parameter
eˆ(g1, g1)αi , g1yi .
Let GIDk , Timek denote the kth identity and time period
queried by algorithm A. For the queries issued to the random
oracle for H1(GIDk||Timek) from algorithm A, algorithm B
responds as follows:
(i) If k > j, then algorithm B randomly chooses
hGIDk ,Timek ∈ ZN , and sets
H1(GIDk||Timek) = g1hGIDk ,Timek .
(ii) If k < j, then algorithm B randomly chooses
hGIDk ,Timek ∈ ZN , and sets
H1(GIDk||Timek) = (g1g3)hGIDk ,Timek .
Note that these are random elements of Gp1p3 since
the values of hGIDk ,Timek modulo p1 and modulo p3 are
uncorrelated).
(iii) If k = j, then algorithm B randomly chooses hGIDj,Timej
∈ ZN , and then sets
H1(GIDj||Timej) = ThGIDj ,Timej .
In all the three cases, algorithm B stores the corresponding
values in order to respond consistently when H1(GIDk||Timek)
is queried again.
For the queries (i, GIDk , Timek) to the key generation &
update oracle from algorithm A, algorithm B responds as
follows. If H1(GIDk||Timek) has already been fixed, then
algorithm B turns to the stored value. Otherwise, algorithm B
creates H1(GIDk||Timek) according to k as above. Algorithm
B forms the key as
skTimeki,GIDk = g1H0(Timek)αiH1(GIDk||Timek)yi .
Notice that when k < j, algorithm B generates the semi-
functional keys of Type 2 with ti being congruent to yi modulo
p3 (these are uncorrelated from the values of yi modulo p1
which appear in the public parameter). Also, recall that the
values ti are fixed for every attribute, and do not vary across
different keys. When k > j, algorithm B generates the nor-
mal keys. When k = j, algorithm B generates a normal key if
T ∈ Gp1 and a semi-functional key of Type 1 if T ∈ Gp1p2 .
For the challenge phase, algorithm A gives algorithm B
two messages M0, M1, a time period Time∗ and an access
matrix (A, ρ). In addition, algorithm A sends algorithm B
the public parameter gyi , eˆ(g1, g1)αi for attributes i belonging
to the corrupt AAs which are included in the access matrix
(A, ρ). In order to generate a challenge ciphertext, algorithm B
chooses a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, and encrypts Mβ as follows.
Note that algorithm B will output a notionally semi-functional
ciphertext, but this will be hidden from the perspective of
algorithm A. First, algorithm B randomly chooses s ∈ ZN ,
and sets C0 = Mβ · e(g1, g1)s. Then algorithm B chooses
three vectors, −→v = (s, v2, . . . , vl), −→w = (0, w2, . . . , wl) and−→u = (u1, . . . , ul), where v2, . . . , vl, w2, . . . , wl, u1, . . . , ul are
randomly chosen from ZN .
Let vx = Ax · −→v , wx = Ax · −→w , and σx = Ax · −→u . Let algo-
rithm B be the subset of the rows of A whose corresponding
attributes belong to the corrupted AAs. Let B¯ be the subset of
the rows of A whose corresponding attributes belong to the
uncorrupt AAs. For each row Ax ∈ B, algorithm B randomly
chooses rx ∈ ZN , and computes the ciphertext as
C1,x = eˆ(g1, g1)vx(eˆ(g1, g1)αρ(x) )H0(Time∗)rx ,
C2,x = g1rx ,
C3,x = (g1yρ(x) )rx(X1X2)wx g3σx .
For each row Ax ∈ B¯, algorithmB randomly chooses ψx, r′x ∈
ZN , implicitly sets rx = rr′x such that g1r is X1, and computes the
ciphertext as
C1,x = eˆ(g1, g1)vx eˆ(g1, X1X2)αρ(x)H0(Time
∗)r′x
,
C2,x = X1X2r′x g3ψx ,
C3,x = X1X2yρ(x)r′x g3yρ(x)ψx(X1X2)wxg3σx .
Note that X1wx is g1Ax·r
−→w
, and r−→w is a random vector with
first coordinate equal to 0. This is a semi-functional ciphertext
with δx = Ax · c−→w modulo p2 where g2c is X2, g2γx equals X2r′x ,
zρ(x) = yρ(x) modulo p2, and tρ(x) = yρ(x) modulo p3.
This is a correctly generated. Note that since r′x, yρ(x) are ran-
domly chosen in ZN , their values modulo p1 and modulo p2 are
uncorrelated. This means that γx, ψx, zρ(x), tρ(x) are randomly
distributed. It is clear that σx is properly distributed, since it is a
share of a random vector. The entries w2, . . . , wl of −→w are also
randomly distributed modulo p2, but the values of δx are the
shares of 0 from the perspective of algorithmB. It remains to be
argued that these appear to be the shares of a random exponent
in the view of algorithm A.
Let the space R denote the span of the rows of A whose
attributes are in B and the rows whose attributes ρ(x) are
queried by algorithm A with identity and time period GIDj,
Timej. This space cannot include the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0)
(assume that this modulo p2), so there is some vector
−→
u′ which
is orthogonal to R modulo p2 and not orthogonal to (1, 0, . . . , 0).
Write c−→w = −→w′ + a−→u′ for some a modulo p2 and
−→
w′ in the
span of the other basis vectors. Note that
−→
w′ is uniformly dis-
tributed in this space, and reveals no information about a. The
value of the first coordinate of c−→w modulo p2 depends on the
value of a, but the shares δx for Ax ∈ B contain no information
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about a. The information algorithm A receives about the value
of a emerges in the exponents of the form δx + γxzρ(x), where
zρ(x) is a new random value each time that has not appeared
anywhere else (recall that ρ is constrained to be injective). Note
that these zρ(x) values modulo p2 do not occur in any keys for
identities and time periods not equal to GIDj, Timej, since these
keys are either normal or semi-functional of Type 2, they do not
have components in Gp2 . As long as γx does not equal 0 (γx = 0
with only negligible probability), this means that any value of
δx can be explained by zρ(x) taking on a particular value. Since
zρ(x) is uniformly random, this means that no information about
the value of a modulo p2 is revealed. Hence, the value being
shared is information-theoretically hidden, and the values of δx
are properly distributed in the view of algorithm A.
Though it is hidden from algorithmA, the fact that δx can only
be made to be the shares of 0 is crucial here (i.e. algorithmB can
only make a notionally semi-functional ciphertext). If algorithm
B attempts to test the semi-functionality of the jth key for itself
by making a ciphertext the key could decrypt, decryption would
succeed regardless of the presence of Gp2 components, since the
δx’s are shares of 0. Hence algorithm B would not be able to tell
whether the jth key is semi-functional of Type 1 or normal.
In summary, when T ∈ Gp1 , algorithm B properly simulates
Gamej−1,2. When T ∈ Gp1p2 , algorithm B properly simulates
Gamej,1 with probability negligibly close to 1. Hence, algo-
rithm B can use algorithm A to obtain advantage negligibly
close to  in breaking Assumption 2.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.3.
Lemma 4.4. Assuming that there exists a polynomial time
algorithm A such that AdvGamej,1A − Adv
Gamej,2
A = , then there
exists a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage  in
breaking Assumption 3.
Proof. Given N , g1, X1X3, Y2Y3, T , algorithmB chooses a hash
function H0 : {0, 1}∗ → ZN , and will simulate either Gamej,1 or
Gamej,2 with algorithm A, depending on the value of T . Algo-
rithm B outputs g1 as the public generator of Gp1 and N as the
group order. Algorithm A specifies a set S′ ⊆ S of the corrupt
AAs for S being the set of all the AAs in the system. For each
attribute i belonging to an uncorrupt AA, algorithm B chooses
random exponents αi, yi ∈ ZN , and gives algorithmA the public
parameter eˆ(g1, g1)αi , g1yi .
Let GIDk , Timek denote the kth identity and time period
queried by algorithmA. For the queries to the random oracle for
H1(GIDk||Timek) from algorithm A, respectively, algorithm B
responds as follows:
(i) If k > j, then algorithm B randomly chooses
hGIDk ,Timek ∈ ZN , and sets
H1(GIDk||Timek) = g1hGIDk ,Timek .
(ii) If k < j, then algorithm B randomly chooses
hGIDk ,Timek ∈ ZN , and sets
H1(GIDk||Timek) = (X1X3)hGIDk ,Timek .
Note that these are the random elements of Gp1p3 since
the values of hGIDk ,Timek and hTimek modulo p1 and
modulo p3 are uncorrelated).
(iii) If k = j, then algorithm B randomly chooses
hGIDk ,Timek ∈ ZN , and sets
H1(GIDk||Timek) = ThGIDk ,Timek .
In all the three cases, algorithm B stores the correspond-
ing values to respond consistently when H1(GIDk||Timek) is
queried again.
For the queries (i, GIDk , Timek) to the key generation &
update oracle from algorithm A, algorithm B responds as
follows. If H1(GIDk||Timek) has already been fixed, then algo-
rithm B uses the stored value. Otherwise, algorithm B creates
H1(GIDk||Timek) according to k as above. Algorithm B forms
the key as
skTimeki,GIDk = g
H0(Timek)αi
1 H1(GIDk||Timek)yi .
Note that when k < j, algorithm B simulates the semi-
functional keys of Type 2 for ti being congruent to yi modulo
p3 (these are uncorrelated from the values of yi modulo p1
which appear in the public parameter). When k > j, algo-
rithm B simulates the normal keys. When k = j, algorithm B
simulates a semi-functional key of Type 1 if T ∈ Gp1p2 and a
semi-functional key of Type 2 if T ∈ Gp1p3 .
For the challenge phase, algorithm A gives algorithm A two
messages M0, M1, a time period Time∗ and an access matrix
(A, ρ). Additionally, algorithm A sends algorithm B the pub-
lic parameter gyi , eˆ(g1, g1)αi for attributes i belonging to the
corrupt AAs which are included in the access matrix (A, ρ).
Algorithm B chooses a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, and encrypts Mβ
as follows to generate a challenge ciphertext. First, algorithm
B randomly chooses s ∈ ZN , and sets C0 = Mβ · eˆ(g1, g1)s.
Then, algorithm B chooses three vectors, −→v = (s, v2, . . . , vl),−→w = (0, w2, . . . , wl), −→u = (u1, . . . , ul), where v2, . . . , vl,
w2, . . . , wl, u2, . . . , ul are randomly chosen from ZN .
Let x = Ax · −→v , wx = Ax · −→w and δx = Ax · −→u . Let B
denote the subset of the rows of A whose corresponding
attributes belong to the corrupt AAs. Let B¯ be the subset of the
rows of A whose corresponding attributes belong to the uncor-
rupt AAs. For each row Ax, algorithm B randomly chooses rx ∈
ZN . If row Ax ∈ B, the ciphertext is computed as
C1,x = eˆ(g1, g1)vx(eˆ(g1, g1)αρ(x) )H0(Time∗)rx ,
C2,x = g1rx ,
C3,x = (g1yρ(x) )rx(g1)wx(Y2Y3)δx .
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If row Ax ∈ B¯, the ciphertext is computed as
C1,x = eˆ(g1, g1)vx eˆ(g1, g1)αρ(x)H0(Time
∗)rx
,
C2,x = g1rx(Y2Y3)rx ,
C3,x = g1yρ(x)rx g1wx(Y2Y3)yρ(x)rx(Y2Y3)δx .
Note that this implicitly sets zρ(x) ≡ yρ(x) modulo p2 and tρ(x) ≡
yρ(x) modulo p3. Since these values are uncorrelated, and the
sharing vector −→u is random modulo p2 and p3, this is a correctly
created semi-functional ciphertext.
Thus, when T ∈ Gp1p2 , algorithm B successfully simulates
Gamej,1. When T ∈ Gp1p3 , algorithm B successfully simulates
Gamej,2. Hence, algorithm B can use algorithm A to obtain
advantage  in breaking Assumption 3.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.4.
Lemma 4.5. Assuming that there exists a polynomial time
algorithm A such that AdvGameq,2A − Adv
GameFinal
A = , then
there exists a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage  in
breaking Assumption 4.
Proof. Given g1, g2, g3, g1a, g1bg3b, g1c, g1acg3d , T , algorithm
B chooses a hash function H0 : {0, 1}∗ → ZN , and will simulate
either Gameq,2 or GameFinal with algorithmA, depending on the
value of T . AlgorithmB outputs g1 as the public generator of Gp1
and N as the group order. AlgorithmA specifies a set S′ ⊆ S of
the corrupt AAs for S being the set of all the AAs in the system.
For each attribute i belonging to an uncorrupt AA, algorithm B
randomly chooses α′i , y′i ∈ ZN , and gives algorithmA the public
parameter
eˆ(g1, g1)αi = eˆ(g1a, g1bg3b)eˆ(g1, g1)α′i ,
g1yi = g1ag1y′i .
Note that this sets αi = ab + α′i , yi = a + y′i.
For the queries the random oracle for H1(GID||Time)
from algorithm A, algorithm B randomly chooses fGID,Time,
hGID,Time ∈ ZN , and sets
H1(GID||Time) = (gb1g3b)−H0(Time)g
fGID,Time
1 g3
hGID,Time
.
Algorithm B stores this values.
For the queries (i, Time, GID) to the key generation & update
oracle from algorithm A, algorithm B responds as follows.
If both H1(GID||Time) has already been fixed, algorithm
B spots the stored value. Otherwise, algorithm B creates
H1(GID||Time) as above. Considering only the subgroup 1
part, algorithm B needs to compute
skTimei,GID = g
(ab+α′i)H0(Time)
1 (g
−bH0(Time)+fGID,Time
1 )
a+y′i
= gH0(Time)ab+H0(Time)α
′
i
1 g
−baH0(Time)+fGID,Timea
1
× g−bH0(Time)y
′
i+y′ifGID,Time
1
= (ga1)fGID,Timeg
H0(Time)α′i+fGID,Timey′i
1 g
−by′iH0(Time)
1 .
Note that only g−by
′
ifTime
1 in the above formula is unknown
to algorithm B, and the rest can either be easily computed
or be cancelled. To have g−by
′
ifTime
1 , algorithm B computes
(gb1g
b
3)
−y′ifTime , and thus the full key can be formed as
(ga1)
fGID,TimegH0(Time)α
′
i+fGID,Timey′i
1
(gb1g
b
3)
−y′iH0(Time)ghGID,Timey
′
i
3 .
For the challenge phase, algorithm A gives algorithm B two
messages M0, M1, a time period Time∗ and an access matrix
(A, ρ). Also, algorithm A sends algorithm B the public param-
eter gyi , eˆ(g1, g1)αi for attributes i belonging to the corrupt AAs
which are included in the access matrix (A, ρ). Let B denote the
subset of the rows of A whose corresponding attributes belong
to the corrupt AAs. Let B¯ be the subset of the rows of A whose
corresponding attributes belong to the uncorrupt AAs. Algo-
rithm B chooses a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, and encrypts Mβ as
follows.
AlgorithmB computes C0 = Mβ · T with the setting s = abc.
If T = eˆ(g1, g1)abc, this will be an encryption of Mβ . If T is ran-
dom, this will be an encryption of a random message.
AlgorithmB chooses a random vector −→u1 ∈ ZlN , of which the
first entry is 1 and −→u1 is orthogonal to all the rows in B (such a
vector is assumed to be of existence, since otherwise the access
matrix is illegal or a non-trivial factor of N can be found, vio-
lating the complexity assumptions). Algorithm B also chooses
a vector −→u2 ∈ ZlN , of which the first entry is 0 and the rest are
randomly chosen. Define the vector −→v = abc−→u1 + −→u2 (note
that this vector is uniformly random from algorithmA’s view).
Let vx = Ax · −→v = abcAx · −→u1 + Ax · −→u2 . Since algorithm B
is not able to compute eˆ(g1, g1)abcAx·
−→u1 for the rows Ax ∈ B¯,
it sets
rx = − cAx ·
−→u1
H0(Time∗)
+ r′x,
where r′x is randomly chosen from ZN . Then
vx + H0(Time∗)αρ(x)rx
= abcAx · −→u1 + Ax · −→u2
+ H0(Time∗)(ab + α′ρ(x))
(
− cAx ·
−→u1
H0(Time∗)
+ r′x
)
= Ax · −→u2 − cα′ρ(x)Ax · −→u1
+ H0(Time∗)abr′x + H0(Time∗)α′ρ(x)r′x.
Thus, algorithm B can compute C1,x for Ax ∈ B¯ as
C1,x = eˆ(g1, g1c)−α
′
ρ(x)
Ax·−→u1 eˆ(g1a, g1bg3b)H0(Time
∗)r′x
× eˆ(g1, g1)Ax·
−→u2+H0(Time∗)α′ρ(x)r′x
.
For the rows Ax ∈ B, algorithmB randomly chooses rx ∈ ZN ,
and computes
C1,x = eˆ(g1, g1)Ax·
−→u2 (eˆ(g1, g1)αρ(x) )H0(Time
∗)rx
.
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Note that vx = Ax · −→u2 for these rows because −→u1 is orthogo-
nal to Ax. For the rows Ax ∈ B¯, algorithm B randomly chooses
γx ∈ ZN , and computes C2,x as
C2,x = (g1c)−Ax·
−→u1+r′x(g2g3)γx .
Note that the values of γx modulo p2 and p3 are uncorrelated,
so this is correctly generated. For the rows Ax ∈ B, algorithm B
can simply compute C2,x = g1rx .
AlgorithmB now randomly chooses a vector −→w with the first
entry equal to 0 and the other entries randomly chosen from ZN ,
and a random vector −→u3 whose entries are all randomly chosen
from ZN . Let wx = Ax · −→w and δx = Ax · −→u3 . For the rows Ax ∈
B, since
yρ(x)rx = (a + y′ρ(x))(−cAx · −→u1 + r′x)
= −acAx · −→u1 − cy′ρ(x)Ax · −→u1 + r′xa + y′ρ(x)r′x,
algorithm B computes C3,x as
C3,x = g1wx(g1c)−y
′
ρ(x)
Ax·−→u1 (g1a)r
′
x g1
y′
ρ(x)
r′x
× (g1acg3d)−Ax·
−→u1 (g2g3)δx+γxy
′
ρ(x)
.
This is consistent with tρ(x) being congruent to y′ρ(x) modulo
p3 in the keys. Note that the sharing vector in subgroups Gp2 and
Gp3 is −d−→u1 + −→u3 , which is random modulo p2 and modulo p3.
For the rows Ax ∈ B, algorithm B computes C3,x as
C3,x = (g1yρ(x) )rx g1wx(g2g3)Ax·
−→u3
.
The sharing vector is consistent here because −→u1 is orthog-
onal to all of these rows Ax. This is a correctly generated
semi-functional ciphertext with s = abc. If T = eˆ(g1, g1)abc,
this is a semi-functional encryption of Mβ , and algorithm B has
simulated Gameq,2. If T is random, this is a semi-functional
encryption of a random message, and algorithm B has simu-
lated GameFinal. Hence, algorithm B can use algorithm A to
obtain advantage  in breaking Assumption 4.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.5.
5. DISCUSSION
In this section, we make a comparison among some revocable
ABE schemes, and then show some interesting extensions to our
revocable and decentralized ABE system.
5.1. Comparisons
As far as we know, besides the work in this paper, Refs [7, 8,
18] are also about ABE systems supporting indirect revocation.
These systems manage to solve revocation problem from differ-
ent point of views. This paper aims to achieve indirect revoca-
tion in a decentralized CP-ABE system such that the AAs can
indirectly accomplish revocation by stopping updating the keys
for the revoked users. In [7], a revocable KP-ABE scheme is pro-
posed using indirect revocation where the AA enables the revo-
cation by forcing the revoked users to be unable to update their
keys. In [8], a hybrid revocable KP-ABE system is raised under
selective security model which allows a sender to select whether
to use either direct or indirect revocation mode when encrypting
a message. In [18], the first revocable ABE scheme is provided
in a generic way that deals with the problem of efficiently revok-
ing stored data, where the database can periodically update the
ciphertexts using only publicly available information stored on
the system. Compared with other ABE schemes supporting indi-
rect revocation, the major advantage of our system is that there
are no prefixed values on the numbers of users, revoked users,
attributes and time periods allowed for the system.
In Table 1, we compare the scalability of our system with
those KP-ABE or CP-ABE schemes under indirect revocation
in [7, 8, 18], in which ‘preset’ means that the value is confirmed
during the setup phase of the system. Let m be the maximum
number of attributes allowed for the system, t be the maxi-
mum number of time periods allowed for the system, d be the
maximum number of attributes allowed to be revoked for the
system. From Table 1, it is not difficult to see that our con-
struction has an edge in achieving scalability among indirectly
revocable ABE schemes, because an attribute can be freely
added or revoked at any time without affecting the execution
of the system.
In Table 2, we compare the efficiency of our system with
the revocable ABE schemes in [7, 8, 18] and the basic scheme
of our system [6], where the values corresponding to the first
two and the next three schemes show the number of group ele-
ments in Gp and GN , respectively, and the symbol—denotes
not-applicable. Denote by |sk|, |ct|, |uk|, |pk| the size of user
TABLE 1. Comparison of scalability among revocable ABE
systems.
KP in [7] KP in [8] KP in [18] CP in [18] Our CP
Preset m
√ √ √ √ ×
Preset d
√ √ √ √ ×
Preset t
√ √ √ √ ×
TABLE 2. Comparison of efficiency among ABE systems. Note
that below we assume that each AA in our system is in charge of one
attribute.
|sk| |ct| |uk| |pk|
KP in [7] 2l log(n) + 1 k + 2 2 (r log ( nr )+ r) m + 3
KP in [8] 2(l + 1) log(n) k + 3 2 (r log ( nr )+ r)  m + 3
KP in [18] 2ln k + 2 – m + 4
CP in [18] 2(k + 2)n 2(l + 1) – m + 4
CP in [6] n 3l + 1 – 3
Our CP n 3l + 1 n − r 3
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private key, ciphertext overhead, user update key and fixed sys-
tem public key, respectively. Let r be the number of the revoked
users, n be the number of all the users, l be the size of the num-
ber of the attributes presented in the access structure, k be the
size of the attribute set, m be the maximum size allowed for
k. According to Table 2, we can see that our system performs
better in alleviating AA’s computation consumption than other
revocable systems when l > n/2, r > n/5, yet accomplishes
the same efficiency of the original decentralized ABE scheme
without revocation in [6].
5.2. Extension to logarithmic size of key updates
In our previous scheme, each AA works linearly in the num-
ber of users, so it could be desirable to find countermeasures to
ameliorate it. We can simply employ to the above scheme the
complete-subtree method [21] to reduce the size of key updates
from linear to logarithmic in the number of users [7, 8, 18].
To begin with, we recall the node selection algorithm KUN-
odes introduced in [7], which computes the minimal set of nodes
for which key update needs to be published so that only non-
revoked users at each time period are able to decrypt the cipher-
texts. In our new scheme, each AA will be assigned a binary tree
BTi. Let BTi be a binary tree with N leaves corresponding to
N users. Denote rooti by the root node of the tree BTi. If L is a
leaf node then Path(L) denotes the set of nodes on the path from
L to rooti, including both L and rooti. If L is a non-leaf node,
then Ll, Lr denote left and right child of L. The algorithm KUN-
odes takes the binary tree BTi, the revocation list rli and a revo-
cation time period Time as input, it marks all the ancestors of
revoked nodes as revoked, and then outputs all the non-revoked
children of revoked nodes. Refer to [7] for a pictorial depiction
and details of the formal definition about KUNodes.
KUNodes(BTi, rli, Time)
X , Y ← ∅.
∀(Li, Timei) ∈ rli,
if Timei ≤ Time, then add Path(Li) to X .
∀τ ∈ X ,
if τl /∈ X , then add τl to Y ;
if τr /∈ X , then add τr to Y .
If Y = ∅, then add rooti to Y .
Return Y .
Below we give the algorithms of our new construction, which
mostly follow that in the previous scheme except that the Key-
Gen & KeyUpdate algorithm in the prior construction will be
replaced by three algorithms.
(i) GSetup. The same as in the previous construction.
(ii) ASetup. The same as in the previous construction.
(iii) Private key generation. This algorithm chooses an unas-
signed leaf note L from BT and store GID in this node.
For each node τ ∈ Path(L), if it is undefined, it chooses
ai,τ ∈ ZN , stores ai,τ in the node τ . Otherwise, it fetches
the stored ai,τ , and computes
Pi,τ = g1ai,τ+αi · H1(GID)yi .
It outputs {τ , Pi,τ }τ∈Path(L) and the update state sti as
BTi.
(iv) Key update generation. For each node τ ∈
KUNodes(BTi, rli, Time), this algorithm chooses
ai,τ ∈ ZN and stores ai,τ in the node τ if it is undefined.
Otherwise, it fetches the stored ai,τ and computes
Qi,τ = g1ai,τ H0(Time)+αi · H1(Time)si,τ ,
Q′i,τ = g1si,τ ,
where si,τ is randomly chosen from ZN . It outputs
{τ , Qi,τ , Q′i,τ }τ∈KUNode(BTi,rli,Time).
(v) Decryption key generation. This algorithm takes
{j, Pi,j}τ∈J , {j′, Qi,j′ , Q′i,j′ }τ∈J ′) for some set of nodes J ,
J ′ as input. If J ∩ J ′ = ∅, it outputs ⊥. Otherwise, it
chooses an arbitrary τ ∈ (J ∩ J ′), and outputs
skTimei,GID = (τ , Pi,τ , Qi,τ , Q′i,τ ).
(vi) Encrypt. This algorithm follows that in the pre-
vious construction except that the ciphertext
C = (C0, {C1,x, C2,x, C3,x, C4,x}) as
C0 = M · eˆ(g1, g1)s,
∀x C1,x = eˆ(g1, g1)vx eˆ(g1, g1)αρ(x)rx ,
C2,x = g1rx , C4,x = H1(Time)rx ,
C3,x = g1yρ(x)rx g1wx .
(vii) Decrypt. This algorithm follows that in the previous
construction except that it firstly computes
K0,x = eˆ(H1(GID), C3,x)
eˆ(Px,τ , C2,x)
= eˆ(H1(GID), g1)
wx
eˆ(gax,τ+αx1 , g1rx)
,
K1,x =
eˆ(Q′x,τ , C4,x)
eˆ(Qx,τ , C2,x)
= 1
eˆ(gax,τ H0(Time)+αx1 , g1rx)
.
Then it computes
C1,x · K0,x
H0(Time)
H0(Time)−1 · K1,x
1
1−H0(Time)
= eˆ(g1, g1)vx · (eˆ(H1(GID), g1)wx)
H0(Time)
H0(Time)−1
= eˆ(g1, g1)vx · eˆ(H1(GID)
H0(Time)
H0(Time)−1 , g1)wx .
Thereafter, it outputs the encrypted message as that in
the previous construction.
To prove the security, the proving technique in [7] needs to be
combined to the proof of our previous construction. We omit the
details here.
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5.3. Improvements
Our system can be improved as follows.
(i) Prime order groups. It would be more pleasant to use
groups of prime order which can potentially result in
more efficient systems (via faster group operations).
One approach is to replace the group order of three
primes in our scheme with a group order of one prime,
but as far as we know, the security of such a con-
struction could not be reduced under a non-interactive
assumption [6]. Also, there is a class of general trans-
formations of converting pairing-based cryptosystems
from composite-order groups to prime-order groups
that has been discussed in [22], yet none of them is
suitable to our construction.
(ii) Removing the random oracle. The random oracle model
has been proved to be extremely useful for designing
simple, efficient and highly practical solutions for many
problems, but from a theoretical point of view, a secu-
rity proof in the random oracle model is only a heuristic
indication of the system’s security when instantiated
with a particular hash function [23]. As mentioned in
[12], the method adopted to obtain large universe con-
structions for ABE is applicable to remove the random
oracle, but it is far from ideal [12] as this makes the
system vulnerable to collusion attacks.
In the future, we would like to improve our system by propos-
ing more feasible and compatible solutions to these problems.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Inspired by the observation that multi-authority can reduce the
trust on a single AA, we put forth a notion of revocable and
decentralized ABE to alleviate the AA’s work in the periodical
update phase where the revoked users will not be provided with
the key update information, which splits the exclusive AA’s
role across multiple AAs. In our system, any party can become
an AA without any global communication except the gener-
ation for the public parameters. A party can simply act as an
AA by creating a public and private key pair, and then issuing
and periodically updating the private keys for different users
that reflect their attributes under its master private key and the
public parameter. Besides, if an AA’s attribute is revoked, this
AA can freely leave the system by being unavailable, which
has no impact on other AAs. When some attributes of a user
is revoked, the corresponding AAs can simply stop updating
for this user without affecting other AAs’ function. A data
provider can encrypt data over any time period and any boolean
formula over the attributes issued from any chosen set of AAs.
In addition, there is no requirement for any central AA in our
system.
In building such a system, the major technical crux is to make
it secure against collusion attacks. Because in our system each
component of a user’s private key will come from different
AAs and there is no coordination between these AAs, the key
randomizing technique of binding together different compo-
nents (representing different AAs) of the private key cannot be
employed. To overcome this, we trickly tie the key components
together and prevent collusion attacks between different users
with distinct global identifiers and the same time attribute.
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